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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002538

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PHUM](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: CALL FOR SEVEN-PARTY ALLIANCE UNITY RECEIVES WEAK
RESPONSE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2425

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 2253
[1](#)C. KATHMANDU 2461

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) The Ambassador met separately with President of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) Party (NC-D) Sher Bahadur Deuba and Secretary General of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) Madhav Kumar Nepal on September 16 to deliver a message: unity among the seven political parties and enforcement of law and order were essential over the next three months. The Ambassador stressed that the Maoists' apparent decision to retract their agreement to deploy combatants into cantonments, after sending a letter to the Secretary General requesting UN monitoring of the camps, was a serious breach of the peace process that warranted public criticism (Ref A). The Ambassador reiterated that, as long as the government stayed united and began preventing Maoists from engaging in criminal behavior, the Maoists would not succeed. Both Deuba and MK Nepal agreed with the Ambassador that the government must stay firm on arms management and begin to fulfill the people's need for law and order. However, without disputing the Ambassador's push for alliance unity, neither expressed willingness to work with the Nepal Congress Party (NC). Rather, both leaders complained about the Prime Minister's lack of communication and secretive behavior.

PARTIES' SILENT RESPONSE TO MAOISTS BREACH OF UN AGREEMENT

[1](#)2. (C) In separate meetings with President of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) Party (NC-D) Sher Bahadur Deuba and Secretary General of the Communist Party of Nepal - United

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Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) Madhav Kumar Nepal on September 16, the Ambassador stressed the seriousness of the Maoists' recent communique in which they refused to place their weapons and combatants in cantonments before entering the government. The Ambassador indicated his surprise that civil society, the government, and the UN had not strongly

criticized the Maoists for reneging on cantonment, which they had requested in a letter to the UN Secretary General on August 9 (Ref B). The Ambassador also noted that he had used his press coverage during his trip to the far- and mid-western regions of Nepal to remark that the real threat to the peace process have been Maoists' daily illegal activities, which they were using as a card to blackmail the entire country into getting what they want.

13. (C) The Ambassador informed both leaders that he had met with Prime Minister GP Koirala one week earlier. Koirala had said he intended within 15 days to criticize publicly the Maoists for their violation of the peace process and provide a stronger mandate to security officials to enforce law and order (Ref C). Both MK Nepal and Deuba agreed that the government needed to focus its criticism on the Maoist disruption of the peace process, but said they were unaware of Koirala's plans.

MAOIST LENINIST STRATEGY

14. (C) The Ambassador explained to both leaders how his trip to the west reinforced his belief that the Maoists had switched their strategy to the Leninist model of urban-based revolution. He described Darchula as relatively secure and said the people of Nepalgunj were happy the killings had stopped, even though extortion continued. The Nepal Army (NA) was still training in the military bases he visited, and seemed to maintain good discipline and relatively high morale. The Maoists did not seem to hold a lot of popular support. Overall, it was clear to the Ambassador that the Maoists had abandoned the Mao-inspired concept of strategic offensive that they had adopted in August 2004, which called for attacking the cities from the countryside.

15. (C) Rather, the Ambassador stated that the Maoists were currently pursuing the Leninist model. The Ambassador reviewed Maoist behavior since the King's overthrow in April and noted the parallels with the Bolsheviks, who manipulated the Russian bourgeois state to topple the government and gain control. Just as the Bolsheviks overthrew the Czar in February 1917, the Maoists supported the people's movement to overthrow the King in April. After threatening violence, demanding concessions from the government and weakening the state throughout the year, the Bolsheviks employed the smallest amount of violence necessary in the 1917 October Revolution to overthrow the bourgeois government. Cautioning both MK Nepal and Deuba, the Ambassador emphasized that Maoist actions and words since April indicated they believed they could successfully topple the Government of Nepal (GON).

THE CRUCIAL NEXT THREE MONTHS

16. (C) The Ambassador described the next three months as the most important in Nepal's history: the Maoists would likely form a third people's movement in a few weeks. If the GON still did not cave to Maoist demands, they could well start a campaign of urban violence. Deuba's wife Arzu agreed, expressing her fear that the Maoists would soon start killing thousands in the Valley. She characterized the upcoming violence as a battle of "democracy versus the Maoists." Deuba clarified that he agreed with the Ambassador, that the Maoists would begin with large demonstrations in the street and then turn to violence.

17. (C) The Ambassador reported to MK Nepal and Deuba that the PM had asked the Ambassador to promote unity among the Parties (Ref C). Clarifying that he had no intention of getting involved in reunification discussions between the NC and NC-D, the Ambassador explained that he agreed with the PM and felt unity among the alliance, particularly the three major parties, was absolutely essential for the GON's survival during the next few months. He stated that he was disappointed that the parties pointed fingers at each other instead of jointly criticizing the Maoists for abandoning

their commitment to cantonment. Deuba agreed and suggested he might meet with MK Nepal to discuss the way forward for the alliance.

AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ISSUES HOLDS STRONG

18. (C) Both Deuba and Nepal expressed their agreement on the most crucial point, arms management and the Maoist criminal behavior had to be dealt with before the Maoists could enter the government. MK Nepal criticized Maoist attempts to obtain the people's support through intimidation, and both agreed that the Maoists would continue to push for concessions from the GON without holding up their part of the bargain.

19. (C) Without downplaying the threat the Maoists posed in the near-term, MK Nepal maintained his hopeful vision for an eventual democratic transition. He hoped that the GON and the Maoists would soon agree on an interim constitution, with the Maoists separating from arms, becoming part of the government, and foregoing their insistence for separate governing institutions. He predicted elections for the Constituent Assembly could take place in May 2007, with debatable issues settled first in the Interim Constitution. He also planned to propose to the Prime Minister the creation of a Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation to handle the peace process. Nepal stated that the government needed to remain aware of the danger the Maoists pose, but still grant the Maoists space to enter the government and transform into a legitimate political party.

10. (C) The Ambassador cautioned MK Nepal to focus on the short term and continue to urge arms management. He stated that the Maoists know that the government wants peaceful Constituent Assembly elections and will use the GON's eagerness on the democratic transition issue as a bargaining chip on arms management.

TROUBLING LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR ALLIANCE UNITY

11. (C) Both leaders expressed their dismay that the PM had not consulted with them on any major initiatives. The Ambassador suggested that Deuba invite Koirala for a visit to discuss the Parties' future and how to handle the Maoists, but Deuba said he would expect a rebuff. MK Nepal also complained that the CPN-UML was not satisfied with GP Koirala's independent, secretive and power-protective work habits. Nepal suggested that Koirala wanted to become the "new king." He then described to the Ambassador the game of cat and mouse he was currently playing with the PM. When the PM sent Home Minister Situala to MK Nepal's residence on September 15 with an apology for not responding to his call, MK Nepal told Situala that if Koirala began to act like the King and refused to meet with the CPN-UML, Nepal would respond in kind and ignore Koirala.

12. (C) Anju Deuba also lamented that potential NC and NC-D party reunification, which India was strongly urging, was causing tension among the seven parties. She did not agree that reunification was necessarily the right path nor the most important issue at the moment. The Ambassador agreed that the Indians were more confident than he that Nepal would reach Constituent Assembly elections. If Maoist violence erupted, elections might not happen for some time.

COMMENT

13. (C) The Ambassador sent a clear message to the NC-D and CPN-UML: for the next three months, the three major parties would either hang together or hang separately. If they chose to hang together, the Maoists would fail in their effort to break the government and to spoil the democratic transition. If instead, the parties continued their infighting, the Maoists would be convinced that they could grab power through massive demonstrations and a short period of violence in

Kathmandu.

¶14. (C) While both leaders expressed commitment to keeping armed Maoists out of the government, they were less than enthused about working together with the NC. Post will continue to urge party leaders to overcome their hesitation to work together and will continue to urge the parties to communicate. The longer the three parties put personal interests above alliance unity, the more confident the Maoists will be that they can successfully topple the government in their own October Revolution.
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